


Addressing Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety

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Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this session, the participant will be able to:

- Discuss the relationships between behaviors that undermine a culture of safety and suboptimal outcomes.
- Identify a range of behaviors that undermine a culture of safety and describe a “professional accountability pyramid.”
- Articulate the essential elements of an organizational infrastructure for addressing behaviors that undermine a culture of safety.

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Pursuing Reliability

Definition: “Failure free operation over time... effective, efficient, timely, pt-centered, equitable”

Requires:

- Vision/goals/core values
- Leadership/authority (modeled)
- A *safety* culture = willingness to report and address
 - Psychological safety
 - Trust

Institute of Medicine. *Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2002. Nelson et al. *Improving the Reliability of Health Care*. MIT Innovation Series. Boston: Institute for Healthcare Improvement; 2004; Hickson et al. Chapter 1: Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S., ed. *From Front Office to Front Line*. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources; 2012:1-36.

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Professionalism and Self-Regulation

- Professionals commit to:
 - *Technical and cognitive competence*
- Professionals also commit to:
 - *Clear and effective communication*
 - *Being available*
 - *Modeling respect*
 - *Self-awareness*
- Professionalism promotes *teamwork*
- Professionalism demands *self- and group regulation*

Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S, ed. *From Front Office to Front Line*. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources; 2012:1-36.

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Checklists: The Keys to the Kingdom...




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But wait...

 Urbach DR, et al. Introduction of surgical safety checklists in Ontario, Canada. N Engl J Med. 2014 Mar 13;370(11):1029-38.

- Policy: adoption of surgical checklists; Ontario
- Compared mortality, surg compl, readmission and ED visits before and after
- Results:
 - Adjusted risk of death **0.71% before** and **0.65% after**
 - Adjusted risk of surgical complications **3.86% before** and **3.82% after**

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Still more...

 Reames BN, et al. A Checklist-Based Intervention to Improve Surgical Outcomes in Michigan: Evaluation of the Keystone Surgery Program. JAMA Surg. 2015 Jan 14. doi: 10.1001/jamasurg.2014.2873. [Epub ahead of print].

- Keystone surgery: Checklist-based QI intervention
- 29 MI hospitals; half implemented, half did not
- Adjusted rates of surgical site infections, wound complications, and 30-day mortality.
- Results:
 - Surgical site infections (**3.2% before; 3.2% after**)
 - Wound complications (**5.9% before; 6.5% after**)
 - 30-day mortality (**2.1% before; 1.9% after**)

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I'm getting...

Surgical safety checklists are not associated with significant reductions in operative mortality or complications...

Not worth our time and effort?

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Case: "A Disturbance"

- The following event was reported to you (an authority figure: Anesthesia Clinical Director, Section Chief or Department Chair) through your electronic event reporting system. Policy defines that you review and follow up.
 - Nurse X (Surgical Circulator) attempted to call a time out prior to start of a [procedure] on patient, Jane Doe, age 5.
 - Team members did not acknowledge... participated in side conversations and continued prepping...

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
Case: "A Disturbance"


- Nurse X tried again
- Dr. Surgeon interrupted, "I think we are all on the same page here...could we please begin," and continued a conversation.

Threat to safety?

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The Right Balance




 Hickson GB, Moore RN, Pichert JW, Bereggi J M. Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources; 2012:3-36.SIU

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What are behaviors that undermine a culture of safety?

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Definition of Behaviors That Undermine a Culture of Safety

Interfere with ability to achieve intended outcomes	Create intimidating, hostile, offensive (unsafe) work environment
Threaten safety <i>(aggressive or violent physical actions)</i>	Violate policies <i>(including conflicts of interest and compliance)</i>

It's About Safety

Excerpts from Vanderbilt University and Medical Center Policy #HR-027, 2010

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


Why are we so hesitant to act?

What barriers exist? vs. Why bother acting?

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Consequences of Unsafe Behavior: Patient Perspective



The diagram shows an iceberg floating in water. The tip of the iceberg is labeled "(tip of the iceberg)" and includes "Lawsuits" and "Infections/Errors". Below the water line, the submerged part of the iceberg includes "Non adherence/noncompliance", "Surgical Complication", "Drop out", "Costs", and "Bad-mouthing the hospital/practice to others".

Felipe W. et al. How, when, and why bad apples spoil the barrel: negative group members and dysfunctional groups. *Research and Organizational Behavior*, 2006; 27:175-222.

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Failure to Address Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety

Leads To:

- Adoption of unprofessional conduct
- Lessened trust, lessened task performance *(always monitoring disruptive person)*
- Threatened quality and patient safety
- Withdrawal

Felipe W. et al. How, when, and why bad apples spoil the barrel: negative group members and dysfunctional groups. *Research and Organizational Behavior*, 2006; 27:175-222.

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Respect, trust and team performance

Our latest work: Patient Complaints & Surgical Outcomes

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
Patient Complaints

Clear and Effective Communication

Dr. ___ did a very poor job of communicating. He raced through an explanation of what we should expect, then left without giving us a chance to get clarification.

Respectful

Dr. ___ didn't listen to me. Dr. ___ interrupted me while I was explaining my symptoms and said, "I got it. I already know all I need to know..."



NSQIP and Pt Complaints

Question: Do Periop Risk Factors moderate the relationship between Patient Complaints and Surgical Outcomes?



Risks	Preop Risk Factors	Patient Complaints	Comp Categories	Outcomes	Surgical Occurrences
	ASA Class		Care & Treatment		Intraoperative
	Priority Status		Communication		Wound
	Wound Class		Concern for Pt/Family		Urinary
			Accessibility		CNS
			Billing w/C&T concern		Respiratory
					Other

Results: Significant relationships between Occurrences & Complaints

- 66 surgeons; 10,536 procedures
- Correlations between pt complaints and occurrences:

Occurrences	Correlation with Patient Complaints
Intraoperative	0.58, p<.001
Wound	0.60, p<.001
Urinary	0.61, p<.001
Respiratory	0.59, p<.001
Other	0.55, p<.001


The relationship is moderated by perioperative risk



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**To “do something”
requires more than a commitment to
professionalism and personal courage.**

**It requires a plan
(people, process and technology).**

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Critical Elements

Key Factors	Domains
People	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committed leadership, modeled authority Dedicated project champions Engaged implementation team(s)
Policies and Procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clearly articulated organizational values, aligned goals Enforceable policies, procedures tied to expectations Sufficient and appropriate resources to achieve goals Model for tiered interventions
Performance Data & Reviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Robust measurement, surveillance tools, data Processes for thoughtful, reliable data reviews Multi-level training about philosophy, skills, accountability


Hickson GB, Pichert JW, Webb LE, Galbo SG. A complementary approach to promoting professionalism: Identifying, measuring and addressing unprofessional behaviors. Acad Med. 2007 Nov;82(11):1040-1046. Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Chapter 1: Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources;2012:3-36.

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**Policies will not work if behaviors that
undermine a culture of safety go
unobserved, unreported and
unaddressed**


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What Are “Surveillance Tools”?


Risk Event Reporting System


Patient Relations Department



Staff Concerns


Hand Hygiene Performance


Surgical Bundle Compliance

Hickson GB, Moore IN, Pichert JW, Benegas Jr M. Chapter 1: Balancing systems and individual accountability in a safety culture. In: Berman S, ed. From Front Office to Front Line. 2nd ed. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission Resources;2012:3-36.

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Reports of Unprofessional Behavior

RN: Dr. ___ entered the room without foaming in...proceeded to touch area with purulent drainage...I offered a pair of gloves...he took them and dropped them into the trash can

Anesth: Dr. ___ rushed...said to team setting up for surgery, “Let’s get going. Skip all the extra business and get the patient in here...”


RN: In the OR, the team attempted to perform a ‘time out’. Dr. ___ asked everyone to ‘listen carefully,’ then began whistling a tune...it was the Mickey Mouse Club theme song.

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Co-Worker Professionalism Reports about VUMC Physicians over a 3 Year Period

Co-Worker Observation Reporting System: VUMC Physicians – 3 years



— VUMC Physicians
● Attendings with 3 or more Reports (n = 38, 2.8%)
▲ Residents with 3 or more Reports (n = 10, 0.8%)
--- Threshold of Assessment and Review

3% of all Attending Physicians (n=33) were associated with 44% of behavior/conduct reports.
1% of all Residents (n=10) were associated with 28% of behavior/conduct reports.

Percent of Attendings (n=1358) and Residents (n=1272)
January 01, 2012 to December 31, 2014

This material is confidential and privileged information under the provisions set forth in T.C.A. §§ 69-3-130 and 68-11-272 and shall not be disclosed to unauthorized persons.

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Does any of this really work?

- Improves physicians' prescribing, clinical decision making¹
- Reducing malpractice claims and expenses: By greater than 70%²
- Improving hand hygiene practices: From 50% to greater than 95% compliance³
- Addressing behaviors that undermine a culture of safety⁴

¹Schaffner W, et al. JAMA 1983;250:1728-1732; Ray WA, et al. Am J Public Health 1987;77:1448-1450; Greco PJ, Eisenberg JM. New Engl J Med 1993;329:1271-1273
²Hickson et al. JAMA. 2002;287(22):2951-57; Hickson et al. South Med J. 2007;100(8):791-6; Pichert et al. In: Henriksen et al, editors. AHRQ. 2008: 421-30; Hickson & Pichert. In: Youngberg, editor. Jones and Bartlett Publishers; 2012: 347-68; Pichert et al. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2013;39(10):439-46.
³Talbot et al. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2013; 34: 1129-36
⁴Dmochowski et al. Manuscript in preparation, 2014

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
Incurred Expense By Risk Category

Predicted Risk Category*	# (%) Physicians	Relative Expense*	% of Total Expense	Score (range)
1 (low)	318 (49)	1	4%	0
2	147 (23)	6	13%	1 - 20
3	76 (12)	4	4%	21 - 40
4	52 (8)	42	29%	41 - 50
5 (high)	51 (8)	73	50%	>50
Total	644 (100)		100%	

* In multiples of lowest risk group

Moore, Pichert, Hickson, Federspiel, Blackford. Vanderbilt Law Review. 2006.

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The PARS® Process

Share comparative feedback with tiered interventions using the Pyramid for Promoting Reliability and Professional Accountability.

- Identify and train Peer Messengers
- Position for protection from discovery
- Promote accountability

Level 3 "Disciplinary" Intervention
Level 2 "Guided" Intervention by Authority
Level 1 "Awareness" Intervention
"Informal" Cup of Coffee Intervention
Mandated Reviews

No Δ
Pattern persists
Apparent pattern
Single "unprofessional" incidents (merit?)
Egregious
Mandated

Vast majority of professionals - no issues - provide feedback on progress

Adapted from Hickson, Pichert, Webb, & Gabbe. Acad Med. 2007. ©2013 Vanderbilt Center for Patient and Professional Advocacy

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Since FY 2000, PARS® has identified 1160 U.S. physicians as high risk

Total # of high-risk physicians to date: 1160
Departed before 12 month follow up: (95)
First follow-up will be in 2015: (186)
879 with follow-up data

Departed organization unimproved: 56 Physicians (6%)
Unimproved/worse: 122 Physicians (14%)
Successfully completed intervention process or are improving: 701 Physicians (80%)

Joint Commission Journal article honored with ABIM Foundation Professionalism Article Prize
"An Intervention Model that Promotes Accountability: Peer Messengers and Patient/Family Complaints"
by James W. Pichert, Irene N. Moore, Jan Karras, Jeffrey S. Jay, Margaret W. Westlake, Thomas F. Catron and Gerald B. Hickson.


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


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But it is not just about individual performance...

Consider the following challenge...



Awareness Letter

We are all committed to minimizing the risk of healthcare-associated infections. Performing hand hygiene is the most important action we can take to reduce the spread of these infections to our patients and ourselves. For FY11, VUMC's reach goal for hand hygiene is 95% compliance.

For November 2010, **your area's** compliance rate was 35%, and for FY11-to-date, 47%.



A member of our Pillar Goal Committee team will contact you to schedule a time to meet so we may partner in achieving increased hand hygiene in your area.

Bold, red font for demonstration only

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


Estimated Infection Control Impacts Following Interventions to Promote Accountability

Infection	FY10 Pre HH Interv. (baseline)	FY11-13 Expected # Infect'ns	FY11-13 Actual # Infect'ns	# Fewer Infect'ns Over 3 Yrs	Mean Attrib Cost/ Infection*	Est. 3-Yr Savings
Clabsi	172	516	138	378	\$22K	\$8.3MM
VAP*	151	302	132	170	\$24.5K	\$4.2MM
SSI	298	894	669	225	\$19K	\$4.3MM
CAUTI-ICU	111	333	248	85	\$1.5K	\$0.1MM
Estimated Savings				858 infections		\$16.9MM

*VAP Surveillance ended mid-FY13
 *Estimates based on data in: Perencevich, et al. SHEA Guideline. Rating standards while watching the bottom line: Making a business case for infection control. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2007;8:1321-1333.

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- ### Professionalism and Self-Regulation
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Let Us Hear Your Comments and Questions

Now or Later

www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/cppa

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